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In the last quarter of the 20th century the governments of many countries, becoming aware of 
increasing inefficiency, slowing growth or inappropriate allocation of resources, addressed these 
problems by initiating economic liberalization. As we know, a lot of those liberal reforms failed, 
some from the outset, especially large-scale programs in the so-called crony-capitalist and post-
Communist economies that all suffered from excessive state control and the connected behaviour, 
where the democratic tradition had not taken root.  
We learn from recent history how strongly institutions may affect macroeconomic adjustment. It is 
needless to say that a policy for new institutional development must be consistent with 
macroeconomic policy and, in particular, if one puts forward an economic liberalization program, 
this naturally concerns the issue of the institutions of democracy.  
It can be inferred that while a liberal economy implies democracy, transition to the liberal order 
through formal democracy procedures is difficult; thus democracy may be absolutely futile in 
implementing reforms. In this paper we attempt to test this arguable and, in some sense, 
‘uncomfortable’ question.  
We discuss how the organization of society, the complexity of the economy, and its level of 
technological development affect the relationship between the institutions of democracy and 
economic growth; why the foundation of democracy and market institutions at the same time, in a 
society without a relevant historical background, remains problematical; and whether enforcement 




We begin with an introduction of the basic notions and a summary of facts in an attempt to 
understand what is crucial to the success of economic liberalization policies (Section 1). This allows 
us to formulate our basic hypothesis, namely, that while a liberal economy implies democracy, 
transition to the liberal order through formal democracy procedures is difficult, so enforcement of 
the institutions of democracy is necessary. The hypothesis is elaborated in Section 2. In Section 3 
we examine the relation between liberal market, democracy, and economic development, while in 
Sections 4 and 5, using the new institutional approach, we analyse democracy failures in an 
economic context. We proceed with an analysis of authoritarian governance in Section 6, and in 
Section 7 consider some implications for policymaking and the methodology of economic analysis. 
Conclusions are outlined in Section 8.  
Let us first take two seemingly different cases which we believe are be helpful in understanding the 
core of the problem.  
Case 1: Liberalization in Latin America. Until the late 1920s, Argentina and Brazil had per capita 
GDP and growth rates comparable to those in the USA and other developed countries. However, the 
Great Depression, the limits of natural resources and rich, extensively engaged in agriculture lands 
slowed the export-led growth.
1 In an attempt to protect national interests, governments closed the 
economies, replaced foreign investments by transfers which they financed through borrowing, and 
nationalized entire industries. It can be added that policymaking became dependent on the 
discretionary decisions of poorly trained bureaucrats accountable only to the political bosses who 
controlled their badly paid but highly profitable public jobs (Naim, 1995). 
With all this, output growth remained generally slow and by the 1970s - 80-s these economies had 
come to a profound structural imbalance, deep recession, high inflation, and debt crises. The 
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rethinking of economic strategy had enabled the new generation of leaders to start the new 
macroeconomic and fiscal policies; however, in many cases the governments had to launch reforms 
again and again as their first attempts failed.  
Case 2: Liberalization in the former USSR. Over the decades of Communist rule, the Soviet 
economy had grown largely due to a relatively low individual consumption and a literally 
destroying use of the natural resources, for instance, by keeping low prices for energy and other 
inputs disregarding the long-term investments. From the mid-1970s, the USSR had enjoyed a huge 
revenue from the exports of oil and natural gas, while the extracting and other industries had been 
suffering from capital depreciation. By the late 1980s net capital accumulation had become negative 
and growth ceased. Outdated technologies through isolation from the world economy, an excessive 
share of intermediate production, military and sheltered sectors, and the rent-seeking motivation in 
all aspects of economic activity were amongst the factors contributed to the economic decline of the 
Soviet Union.  
Then, initiated in April 1985, Gorbachev’s perestroika opened up the Communist regime to the 
world. The word "transition" gained a new meaning and, about ten years later, we can see that the 
former Communist countries, having followed various routes to transition, found themselves in 
completely different states. While Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and the Baltic 
countries had already achieved sustainable growth and social stability, Russia and Ukraine fell into 
a political mess and a deep recession. Russia, the former dominator, setting the rules, possessing 
huge deposits of natural resources and on the face of it demonstrating growth of economic and 
military power for decades, had almost collapsed. 
Russia turned to growth after the abrupt four-fold devaluation of the national currency in August of 
1998, but this soon stopped. The country showed positive trends again only with the policy actions 
aimed at restructuring and the changes in institutions, attempted since 1999. 
1. The facts: what lies beyond the success of policies for economic liberalization? 
A steadily growing, efficient economy is normally regarded as a competitive market in which 
private funds are highly encouraged and resources can be reallocated relatively freely at relatively 
low costs. Hence economic liberalization, that is the development of such an economic system and 
the social, political, and economic institutions associated with it, often becomes a strategic target of 
governments facing rising inefficiency, slowing growth, or inappropriate, for some reasons or 
others, allocation of resources.
2  
If we look at the facts, we will see that recent history gives many examples of failed liberal reforms, 
especially in the so-called crony capitalist and post-Communist economies, all suffering from state 
control and connected behaviour, where democratic tradition has not taken root and democratic rule 
needs institutionalisation. A list of those successful economic liberalizations which have brought 
about macroeconomic stability, rapid restructuring, and growth is short indeed. It includes such 
different cases as Chile, Poland, the Chinese model and, with less accuracy, a few others from East 
Europe and Latin America. More examples from the East Asian Tigers could probably be added in 
the near future.  
Where do the failures come from? A specific market experience clearly matters. The presence of 
informal democracy institutions, which implies trust among people, the ability to manage networks, 
trade rights and develop public agreements (laws) on the basis of economic rationality rather than 
on family or pulling social strings, an unerased experience of democratic rule in the past, must be 
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important as well if “this tradition is considered to be a variant of the definitional norm for 
individualism” (Buchanan, 1975) because, at any stage of evolution, the market becomes naturally 
framed in and shaped by the informal democracy institutions. 
But whatever the historical meaning of institutional background – is that a sufficient condition to 
determine the success or failure of liberal economic reforms? Seeing the future of a nation as being 
predetermined by its past when it is new circumstances that make people reflect on problems and 
think about reforms, does not look very encouraging. Central European countries have a Western-
type democratic tradition, developed over the centuries; however, China, East Asia and Latin 
America definitely do not have this. Nevertheless, the latter have demonstrated success in economic 
liberalization as well. So it makes sense to assume that the historical background is still not crucial 
and in analysing successful and failed attempts of liberal economic reforms, the proper question to 
ask would be whether the actual economic proposal was relevant to institutions and the current 
economic conditions. 
While differing as regards market experience, varying from almost an unleashed economy in Latin 
America to a centrally planned system in China, all successive in liberalization nations were always 
free from the sheltering state – the state securing not only access to needed public goods but taking 
over the bulk of economic activities, and regulating the consumption and production of marketable 
goods and services. Even in China, with the profound lack of freedom, not only the majority of the 
population outside the reforming sector but also those living in the big cities and in the South-
Eastern area, now experiencing system transformation, have never had a full range of pension and 
social benefits of the Soviet type. Such experience must shape social tensions and expectations. If 
so, it may be assumed that the degree of individual responsibility for present and future means 
much more for the success of liberal reforms than does the degree of economic freedom. Is not the 
difficulty of assimilation that the East Germans are experiencing after national unification evidence 
enough for our conclusion?  
An overview of the reform policies, the initial economic conditions, social systems, and the 
historical and cultural backgrounds of the nations, also suggests that only nations driven by a clear 
and strong motivation in developing a liberal order have managed a restructuring and achieved 
sustainable growth. Sometimes this motivation stems from social tensions, especially if these are 
provoked by influential formal institutions. People in Poland, for instance, always identified 
themselves as a European nation and openly expressed concerns about the former Big Brother’s 
instability and imperialistic ambitions, while the national Catholic Church which is probably the 
most influential non-governmental institution in Poland unambiguously supported such ideas. To a 
large extent, thanks to these tensions, economic liberalization was accepted by the majority of 
people as a sort of movement from the Soviet past toward national independence; transition has 
turned out to be quite rapid and has not faced considerable counteraction. It seems convincing that 
the presence of democratic tradition in Eastern Europe has allowed those nations to become credible 
and, therefore, politically strong governments within relatively short periods of time.  
However, in many cases the motivation in developing the liberal order was brought about by a 
strong authoritarian government (Chile, China). Yet the history of Latin America in the late 20th 
century shows that, even if liberal reforms were initiated by democratic regimes, the positive results 
were not achieved and fixed until the policies had been implemented by a politically strong, highly 
credible government in a relative isolation from the rest of the democratic system. (Hachette and 
Luders, 1993).  
So the facts lead us to the conclusion that, while a liberal economy implies democracy, transition to 
the liberal order through democracy is difficult as democracy may be absolutely futile in 
implementing reforms. Hence, the foundation of democracy and of market institutions at the same 
time in a society without a relevant historical background remains problematical, and Demid Golikov • ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 
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institutionalisation of the liberal economy is possible only with a strong government which is 
allowed to pursue authoritarian policy. Let us elaborate on this hypothesis below.  
2. The hypothesis: institutional basis of the power of government 
In developed countries the need for liberalization was often recognized in the course of cycle 
recessions (U.K. in the late 1970s or Japan in 1999-2001), while many of the developing and post-
Communist nations got down to implementing some liberalization plans only after having 
experienced high inflation and a deep structural imbalance. They had to tackle economic 
liberalization along with macroeconomic stabilization; what is crucial, therefore, is that the 
necessary condition for achieving stabilization is a political will, which implies a strong 
government. So the question of success of economic reforms inevitably leads to the question of 
political power. If a government proposes economic liberalization, does it have sufficient resources 
to control the masses, to manage the balance of interests of various groups? This question probably 
arises ahead of those about professional skills of policymakers or the correctness of target figures.   
Strong power can be built in (formal institutions of) an authoritarian regime which may pursue 
someone’s private as well as public interests, may allow public discussion but in a pure case implies 
no independent judiciary, no public participation in decision making, even with regard to the 
distribution of public goods, and no public control over the authorities. This inevitably induces the 
government to use repressive tools for controlling its citizens.  
Alternatively, strong power can be based on informal social and economic institutions. The social 
contract, which emerges in this case, provides a basis for the formation of effective and credible 
and, thereby, strong government.  
In countries where democracy is deep-rooted, liberalization can be pursued on the basis of the 
existing institutions through enhancing democracy. This is what we can learn from the example of 
Poland given in the previous section; this is what really happened in Eastern Europe and the Baltics. 
But the implementation of an economic liberalization policy bringing in revolutionary changes 
(Mau, Starodubrovskaya, 2001) in countries with a poor democracy tradition is seen as much more 
difficult and complicated, even if the policymaker relies on public support in his or her liberal 
initiative.  
If the policymaker is wholeheartedly given to democracy as the superior value, he or she should 
think whether democracy would actually work on the new ground. Given the right to speak freely 
and vote freely, would the majority of the population work out the variety of alternative views and 
competing proposals in order to vote correctly, from the policymaker’s point of view? The same 
policymaker could be easily voted out, so the reforms can be at a stalemate from the very beginning 
and the liberal idea be misinterpreted and distorted and be, thus, given up by the people for a long 
time to come. Therefore, if democracy comes first, the economy may go from bad to worse. Latin 
America and the former Soviet Union provide strong evidence for this. Does not the vicious circle 
of transition (the more seriously ailing the economy, the deeper the social and political conflict and 
thus the more serious the economic problems) give weight to the unpleasant conclusion that it is 
hardly possible to establish democracy and market institutions at the same time in a society which 
has never had such things before? The only argument weakening this inference is that as the rule of 
law, economics and politics are usually studied separately, their interaction is still unclear, while the 
East European countries are laboratories where this interaction now actually occurs (Elster, 1993; 
Soili Nysten-Haarala, 2000). 
On the other hand, we see only two problems when the government is allowed to use authoritarian 
tools of control. Firstly, the threat of Leviathan (Buchanan, 1975) eventually becomes unavoidable 
and this is largely a political issue. Secondly, limitation of democracy may be inconsistent with 
complexity of the economy, with the level of technology and human capital as, for instance, it Demid Golikov • ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 
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increases costs and reduces the quality of coordination or heightens the risk of wrong decisions. 
This second point is a purely economic issue.  
3. Liberal economy, development, and democracy rule 
Let us examine the latter issue in a broad context. How does the problem of democracy concern 
economics? In what way, to what extent does the social and political institutional framework 
determine economic development and growth in particular?  What can we say about the relation 
between the level of economic development, liberal order, and democracy? Economic, historian, 
and political literature suggests this is a controversial subject. 
It is widely accepted that individual freedom is a superior value, so this is regarded as the only 
appropriate political system. Democracy and political liberty have an importance of their own (Sen, 
1999). Barro (1994), using economic data, wrote that since good ‘democracy’ is desirable for its 
own sake, rich countries consume more democracy because they can afford the reduced rate of 
economic progress. In other words, rich nations render some part of ‘real’ wealth for democratic 
values.  
We also accept the superiority of freedom, but also see a pure economical reasoning behind 
democracy. As was mentioned above, it implies trust among people, the ability to manage networks, 
trade rights and develop public agreements (laws) on the basis of economic rationality rather than 
on family or pulling social strings. So if we believe that democracy is good to the extent that it 
allows individuals to get what they want, individual freedom becomes the overriding objective for 
social policy – not as some metaphysically superior value, but as a necessary consequence of an 
individualist-democratic methodology (Buchanan, 1975). Another important consideration is that 
the practice of democracy gives economic agents the opportunity to learn from each other, and to 
re-examine their own values and priorities, along with those of others (Sen, 1999). Finally, 
democracy appears as a mode of coordination. With these premises, the problem turns out to be an 
issue for economic policy and economics; a link between efficiency and liberal order becomes 
clear.  
Taking into account all the comparative studies that are now available, the hypothesis that there is 
no relation between economic growth and democracy (democratic rule) – in either direction – 
remains extremely plausible (Sen, 1999). According to Barro (1994), who examined growth and 
democracy (subjective indexes of political freedom) for a panel of about 100 countries from 1960 to 
1990, the favourable effects of democracy on growth include maintenance of the rule of law, free 
markets, small government consumption, and high human capital. But once these kinds of variables 
and the initial level of real per-capita GDP are held constant, the overall effect of democracy on 
growth was found weakly negative. It enhances growth at low levels of political freedom but 
depresses growth when a moderate level of freedom has been attained. This is certainly echoed in 
history, and in more than just a partial correlation of democracy indicators and growth outcomes. 
Indeed, investigations can take us beyond the surface level findings of reduced-form growth 
empirics and into some of the more detailed mechanisms by which political structure affects policy 
choices and hence growth (Taylor, 1999).  
So what makes transition to the liberal market through the formal institution of democracy really 
difficult? We begin with the assumption that difficulties in transmitting policy decision into 
economy, imperfections in economic adjustment largely come from the interaction of competing 
individuals within a certain institutional framework; so it is essential that the policy be addressed to 
decisions and actions of such individuals against other agents. 
4. An individual against individuals: effect of inequality  
The political economy literature emphasizes the importance of the public agreement and a coalition 
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1999). It suggests that liberalization requires the transformation of old institutions and the building 
of new ones to bring about an improvement in democracy mechanisms, in particular, entailing more 
effective and, probably, wide-ranging public control.  
Suppose, however, that an explicit or implicit agreement has been achieved and is adhered to. Let 
us think that, while necessary, social peace and public consensus are not sufficient for the success of 
liberal reforms. The democratic system is by nature conservative (Naim, 1995) and may prove 
absolutely futile in providing reforms. Indeed, in adapting to a new economic policy, people change 
views, considerations, norms, actions that partially replace or complement currently existing ones. 
And these innovations may support as well as hamper the policy pursued by the government. Since 
the process of institutional innovations is naturally contingent on the existing institutions, new ones 
may be inconsistent with the targeted liberalism as well as the old. For instance, formal 
establishment of the democracy rule can bring about even more inconsistency, cause more structural 
imbalance or capital flight and, therefore, stave off economic growth and even cause people to vote 
down the liberal reform.  
Why does this happen? It can be shown that the effectiveness of markets comes about because good 
decisions are rewarded more often than bad ones. As in biological selection, the reward system only 
slightly favours the fittest and the best. But over time, that small margin is enough to secure 
continuous improvement (Kay, 1999). Whether this small margin is big enough to secure progress 
against external or exogenous internal social-driven shocks seems to be the crux of the problem. 
This approach, becoming popular in recent years, while seemingly impressive and probably 
convincing, can hardly be incorporated in the conventional economic framework as it generates 
serious methodological difficulties at the level of assumptions. 
In this paper we proceed from the new institutional concept and assume that, first, the society 
consists of heterogeneous individuals who differ in preferences, capacities, access to information 
and, thus, in types of economic activity. If this is so, a fairly uniform distribution of the social, 
political, and market power among individuals can hardly be imagined. Second, we acknowledge 
that signalling and the process of interaction of individuals are economically costly. Thus, complex 
problems of coordination and distribution arise.  
Heterogeneity of agents and the presence of costs of individual interaction shape the society as a 
hierarchical structure which makes coordination more efficient. And democracy is considered to be 
a mechanism securing individual interests in society by allowing individuals to deliver their needs 
to the upper hierarchical levels and to control them. But why democracy? If the examples of today’s 
Malaysia and Singapore are convincing, an authoritarian regime may be effective in control – but 
only democracy seems to be effective in both functions.  
But efficient to what extent?  To a large extent, distortions of efficiency are the result of the 
interaction of heterogeneous agents. As follows from the theory of public choice, small numbers of 
individuals and groups with equal market power can the more easily manage a coalition and lobby 
their interests than large numbers, because organizing a large pool takes higher economic, 
coordination, and social costs than does organizing a small one. Therefore, initiative and power is 
naturally reallocated into the hands of minority. 
On the other hand, relatively large and well-defined (though not necessarily well-organized) 
communities may be captured by the influential minority to be used in holding political negotiations 
and lobbying as the reference groups. But these large and well-defined groups may also be found to 
not necessarily be able to secure their interests and make the government or politically powerful 
groups satisfy their demands, even if a contract between them has been established. A more 
influential though still minor lobbying party can, with ease, break promises and agreements with the 
reference group. Why? The answer is that the latter may hardly be able to counteract simply 
because it is likely to be too large to do so at a reasonable low cost of coordination, etc. Thus, a Demid Golikov • ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 
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policymaker working for social welfare actually represents individuals proportionally to the 
influence they have on him or her.  
The degree of influence crucially depends on, first, the degree of heterogeneity in preferences, 
capacities or access to information and, second, the costs of interaction/coordination. As well social 
institutions impose on individual behaviour and interaction restrictions, related to existing family 
strings and altruistic norms, beliefs, caste, etc.  
Democratic mechanisms are supposed to make for revealing individual wishes, irrespective of the 
social and economic power of each person, and then select and fulfil the alternatives reflecting the 
will of the majority – while, at the same time, protecting the minority. Protecting minority probably 
means helping them to adjust to the situation they did not welcome and which has resulted from the 
choice they did not vote for. To what extent democracy should be protective, should be prescribed 
by the higher law. 
However, the more unequal the distribution of economic power or individual characteristics and the 
higher the costs of interaction, the lower is the individual ability to affect the public decision-
making process. Thus, the less effective is democracy. Moreover, having achieved or initially 
possessing more economic power or enjoying a higher social status, an individual becomes able not 
only to use the delegated public resources for private needs but also to secure the advantages he/she 
has obtained. As this proposition primarily concerns those who, as a result of liberal reforms may be 
replaced and deprived of the rent, it should be clear that a majority voting will most likely fail in 
implementing the much-needed liberal reforms.  
Is this problem easily manageable? We believe that it is a question of institutions – public tensions 
and expectations, the structure of the society, etc. – but also of the initial allocation of factors. The 
latest ‘natural’, purely economic circumstances cannot be ignored. For example, rich endowments 
of oil and other tradable natural resources, exploration of which is associated with a significant 
economy of scale, sentence Russia not only to the notorious Dutch disease but also to a high 
concentration of capital and, therefore, of market power. This makes the development of democratic 
rule in Russia countrywide problematic, if not hopeless. Which is similar, for instance, to the 
centuries-long history of the Americas. Factor endowments, including climates, soils, and the 
density of native population, predisposed North America toward a path with relatively equal 
distribution of wealth and corresponding institutions that favoured of the participation of a broad 
range of population in commercial activity from the era of colonization (Engerman, Sokoloff, 
1994). In contrast, Latin America was fain to develop in the opposite direction and the differences 
in economic performance between them is a clear evidence for our theory. 
5. An individual against individuals: rent-seeking versus economic competition 
Also, hierarchy naturally results in the situation where rent-seeking becomes an effective way of 
competition among individuals; this becomes even more effective if the degree of heterogeneity and 
the costs of interaction are high. This just aggravates the problem of simultaneous 
institutionalization of market and democracy. Rent-seeking does not only mean an unproductive use 
of resources, it may also result in providing wrong incentives leading to the selection of 
economically inefficient decisions and promoting those agents who do not possess the best 
knowledge, skills and technologies (Meyer and Vickers, 1997; Golikov, 1999). Such adverse 
selection arises if, in implementing economic policy, influential groups – in line with above – 
manage to substitute private interests for public ones. Then the choice shifts to alternatives that 
satisfy those private interests but which do not necessarily secure the greatest contribution to 
economic growth and certainly redistribute welfare for the benefit of those private persons and 
groups – thereby, moving the economy away from the Pareto-optimum resources allocation. 
This last means that some of the physical and human resources needed for the implementation of 
the rejected alternatives become unemployed. A part of these resources may be forwarded to Demid Golikov • ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 
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implementation of the selected decision but the other part will be redundant. In general, this means 
an excess supply: workers, for example, would be left with a choice between working for lower 
wages under their potential, and undertaking activities which are more rewarding, given the new 
distribution of economic power. If individual assessment of costs, losses, and difficulties associated 
with coordination, interaction, learning, and adaptation to new conditions, multiplied by the 
evaluation of risks, exceeds expected benefits, then, in addition to the deviation from the Pareto-
optimum, a persistent long-run unemployment emerges, affecting with higher probability those 
resources and technologies which would be the most suitable for the satisfaction of public interests. 
Accordingly, rent-seeking entails a decrease in the efficiency of democracy mechanisms in 
representing individual interests and in exercising control of the top levels of the hierarchy. On the 
other hand, democracy – at least in theory – is the institute that holds back the Leviathan. Here we 
encounter an obvious contradiction between the liberal economic order and democracy: 
institutionalisation of the liberal order, which implies rent reallocation, in a rent-seeking economy 
with deep distinctions between people as regards degree of economic influence and social status 
through democracy is simply a nonsense. 
6. Liberal economy, development, and an authoritarian regime 
Now let us turn to an analysis of the evolution of institutions and authoritarian governance. 
Examples from Latin America and post-Communist East Europe given in the introduction and 
Section 1 are useful in understanding this issue. Another example is Japan: there is no doubt that 
new norms, views, considerations, and concepts brought into Japanese society during the post-War 
American occupation became significant, if not necessary, conditions for a remarkable economic 
growth. It is interesting that Brazil, in contrast, “after the U.S. commitment to multilateralism in 
1934, exploited a marked unwillingness by the United States to use its commercial leverage to 
constrain Brazil to adopt specific policies which would favor US interests – and this apparently 
contributed to Brazil’s decline” (Cambridge History of Latin America, 1999). Similarly to Japan, 
three decades later in Malaysia and Singapore, authoritarian governments made economic growth 
possible.  
However, by the end of the 1990s, when globalisation, integration, and the international financial 
market development had made each economy open and exposed to external shocks and, at the same 
time, drastically complicated coordination, the lack of democracy and liberalism generated crises in 
East Asia; structural disbalance and the current slowdown in Japan featuring quite different trends 
from those which had appeared during previous recessions.  
As mentioned above, democracy is in fact a means of exchange of ideas; it brings about positive 
externalities, synergy, and allows the protecting of intellectual property rights. It also facilitates 
trade as a mode of coordination. This reasoning is becoming more and more important in the new 
global, highly integrated economy in which macroeconomic dynamics become increasingly 
determined by international companies’ decisions, and which features almost perfect informational 
exchange and strongly relies on futures, options, and currency swaps. With these innovations, 
development will probably soon become impossible without democracy. Moreover, we believe that 
while the advances in communication technologies clearly work for convergence of nations, the 
lack of democracy may be a serious obstacle to development in the future. First, because it naturally 
freezes intercommunication as well as intellectual and human capital and, second, because it leads 
to reallocation of intellectual capital from unfavourable places, thus, restraining economic 
development and slowing, if not reversing, convergence. 
Hence any policy-purporting economic development and long term growth should address 
institutions, should involve restructuring of formal institutions, and should be conducive to the 
introduction of new informal institutions. This conclusion allows us to offer a sort of recipe of 
economic liberalization. If democracy is not deep-rooted, if the historical background of democratic Demid Golikov • ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 
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order is rather weak, a strong authoritarian regime (as defined at the beginning of Section 2) can 
help push-start and manage transition at the initial stage, especially if macroeconomic stabilization 
is needed. In such conditions, only an authoritarian regime seems to be able to secure property 
rights, to manage public finance, or to put in effect legal system favouring private property and 
market behavior. This will facilitate new views, perceptions, and social norms and shape new 
patterns of individual behavior.  
All the above innovations which an authoritarian power can afford are essentially static. The 
authoritarian regime may also be able to efficiently maintain coordination in an unsophisticated 
economy with a simple structure. It follows from the same study by Barro (1994) that a negative 
overall effect of democracy on growth over 1960–90 appears as countries at low levels of 
development typically do not sustain democracy; for example, democratic regimes installed in 
newly independent African states in the early 1960s tended not to last. He argues that improvement 
in the living standards – measured by real per-capita GDP, life expectancy, and education – 
substantially increase the probability that political institutions will become more democratic over 
time. Development of liberal economy institutions will bring about welfare growth, so the country 
would tend eventually to become more democratic on its own. 
But an authoritarian regime will probably not be able to manage the market in a complex economy 
enjoying a relatively high level of human capital and integration in the world economy.
3 Hence, 
after liberal market institutions have been established, the sooner the government turns its efforts, 
its power toward building formal democracy institutions, the higher is the probability that the 
economy will turn to sustainable growth. Thus, development of liberal market institutions will be 
driven, to some extent, by the development of informal democracy institutions which, in their turn, 
are supposed to be driven by the formal democracy institutions set up by the authoritarian 
government.  
Not to put too fine a point on it, if people are not used to the liberal market, they should learn to 
become so. They can do it from macroeconomic stability and formal democracy institutions which 
should be, respectively, achieved, set up and maintained by the power of government. This logic 
suggests a reverse sequence of events and relies on a reverse causation that is apparently unusual 
and not in line with Barro (1994), who suggested that advanced Western countries would contribute 
more to the welfare of poor nations by exporting their economic systems (institutions), notably 
property rights and a free market, rather than political systems which typically are developed after 
reasonable living standards have been achieved. Therefore, one can assume that our proposal 
simply may not work. However, any other way of restructuring in countries with no liberal market 
institutions can hardly be seen and the examples of successful and failed reform programs, 
summarized in Section 1, support our conclusion.  
7. Evolution of institutions, external conditions, and individual preferences 
Now we come up with the question for policy-makers: can it be possible to stimulate emergence of 
new institutions and the crowding out, a meltdown of the old ones?  
External conditions or an exogenous shock can make people change their views and behaviour. 
Once allowed, openness – or, for instance, a recognized failure of the central planning system – can 
seed the Communist society with the Weber ethic of capitalism and make adherents of communes 
accept private property rights. Macroeconomic stabilization, for example, can make people save 
more in deposits and other market-friendly ways. Dried-up rent incomes or economic freedom can 
lead to more efficient allocation of labour. However, the speed of adjustment varies widely across 
different post-high-inflation countries and no single regression has been found. Convergence of 
                                                 
3 It is worth  noting that the term ‘authoritarian’ has little in common with the term ‘central planning’. Demid Golikov • ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 
Research Paper • RECEP 
11 
East and West parts of Germany came to a halt in 1996–97, and this country even tends to repeat 
the case of Italy with its divergence of South and North. The East now suffers from a strikingly high 
15–20% unemployment and, at the same time, unfilled vacancies with excess new capacities.  
Not don only these examples suggest that, despite changing macroeconomic, political, and other 
external conditions, distortions may still exist. When external conditions change or an exogenous 
shock affects the economy, this naturally causes a response among individuals, so an adjustment 
process starts. However, such an external shock proved to be insufficient to generate needed 
changes in institutions. Insufficient or inadequate adjustment of institutions leads to rigidities in the 
dynamics of nominal and real macroeconomic variables. The problems of Germany can be 
explained by the crowding-out effect of the huge federal subsidies to the East and by fixing the 
minimal wage rates in the East as high as it is used to be in the West (see Sinn, 2000). But the 
attitude of many people in the East is obviously different to that typical in the West and this, we 
believe, does matter. Underdeveloped, low-liquid financial markets and limited credit is only part of 
the explanation as to why the gross saving/income ratio is relatively high in the Russian or South-
East Asian economies. It would be worth examining the hypothesis that people in Korea or Japan 
are accustomed to higher saving and to planning for a longer perspective than are the Americans or 
Russians.  
We believe that another possible explanation stems from the people’s habits, beliefs, perceptions, 
ultimately from institutions, which shape individual preferences, though this conclusion still needs 
empirical testing. Forcing a person adjust to external conditions or to change his or her mind are 
different matters. The former is about constraint – the opportunity costs of behaving differently – 
while the latter concerns preferences, so individual mentality, the immanence.  
The latter, therefore, concerns individual rationality and has an important implication for 
methodology. Each individual, in accordance with the neoclassical concept, is assumed to be free as 
to taste and a right to make choice, thus to be rational in oneself – and also restricted in access to 
information. The limits of information, the presence of asymmetric information, produce 
dependence of preferences. This may become crucial, for example, in understanding the response of 
economic agents to policies or other external shocks; thus, for the purposes of study, we suggest 
assuming endogenous preferences. 
8. Conclusions 
We argue for an increasing significance of a positive link between democracy, a liberal market, and 
economic development in the complex and new economy. However, the institutionalisation of 
democracy and a market at the same time, in a society without a relevant historical background, is 
problematical because formation of new institutions is contingent on the old ones. While existing 
institutions become inconsistent with a liberal economy, new institutions appearing as a result of 
individual adaptation to the new situation, may either support or hamper policy, and also be 
inconsistent with the liberal economy.  
If in East European countries democracy functions imperfectly, this is not because of the absence of 
a ‘culture’ of democracy, but because that culture is subject to conflicting cross-pulls (Kelsall, 
2000). On the contrary, application of democratic tools, such as majority voting and free elections 
or separation of powers, in countries with different than democracy historical tradition, is likely to 
bring about more of a political mess and further economic decline. 
Thus, a successful policy for economic liberalization is impossible without the introduction and 
enhancement of democracy institutions. However, for this enhancement, even enforcement cannot 
be brought about with only vertical public control, since the latter is not only inefficient in the 
presence of old informal institutions but simply does not work due to the initially unequal allocation 
of economic and social power. Besides, due to the hierarchical organization of society, an effective Demid Golikov • ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 
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way of competition among individuals becomes rent-seeking, especially if the degree of 
heterogeneity and costs of interaction of agents are high.  
This is our understanding of what in Section 2 is called ‘the conservative nature’ of the democratic 
system. ‘Conservative’ means conserving the current state of society, protecting it against changes 
for a new order if the latter implies reallocation of rent to any small degree. So this logically 
requires developing a system of measures aimed at preventing adverse selection and rent-seeking. 
Any structural policy must be concerned for rent owners. A realistic scheme for removal agents 
who are expected to be expropriated from their rent, for instance, a scheme for compensations, 
should be worked out.  
Therefore, if democracy is historically not deep-rooted, if experience of the liberal market is rather 
weak, a strong authoritarian regime empowered to use repressive tools of control is needed for 
implementing liberal economic reforms. However, we foresee two problems if the government is 
allowed to do this. Politically, the threat of Leviathan (Buchanan, 1975) eventually becomes 
unavoidable. Economically, limitation of democracy may become inconsistent with the complexity 
of the economy, the level of technology and human capital, thereby, deteriorating allocation of 
resources and restraining economic growth. It would be wrong to regard these impediments simply 
as the price to be paid by a society for allowing authoritarian rule. Indeed, these impediments are 
conditions shaping the evolution of the society and imposing on the decision making a set of 
restrictions, which should have been realized by policy advisors. 
Therefore, authoritarian tools of control and decision making can help in running the transition at 
the initial stage, especially if macroeconomic stabilization is needed. But after that, the sooner the 
government turns its efforts, its power toward building democracy institutions, the more probably 
will the economy turn to sustainable growth. Thus, development of liberal market institutions will 
be driven, to some extent, by development of informal democracy institutions which, in turn, are 
supposed to be driven by the formal democracy institutions set up by the authoritarian government. 
Accordingly, authoritarian tools (as this term was defined in Section 2) remain the second best but 
still the appropriate choice. 
Any policy must be coherent and a policy for new institutional development aiming at 
institutionalisation of democracy clearly must be consistent with macroeconomic policy. 
Development of institutions and economy is an iterative process but macroeconomic stabilization is 
not sufficient to generate the needed (or desired) adjustments in institutions favouring liberalization 
and irreversibility of the reforms. In this context, the Russian turmoil of the 1990s, referred to as 
Case 2 in the introductory section, should be considered as intrinsically predetermined by the 
centuries-long historical background and, especially, the social and economic performance during 
the Soviet period. The 70 years’ wasteful growth had come to its anticipated dead end by the 1980s. 
Gorbachev's economic program within the well-organized social institutions only accelerated the 
meltdown, and by 1991 had reduced the economy to a shambles. Furthermore, the Soviet legacy 
and reallocation of economic power during the years of perestroika, together with the institutional 
adjustments, became the most important reason behind the failure of the liberal reforms attempted 
by Yeltsin six years later.  
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